Protecting the Ballot

Isabela Mares

$35.00
$22.98

Adding to cart… The item has been added
Author
Isabela Mares
Publish Date
2022-11-08
Subtitle
How First-Wave Democracies Ended Electoral Corruption
Book Type
Paperback
Number of Pages
241
Publisher Name
Princeton University Press
ISBN-10
0691240035
ISBN-13
9780691240039
citemno
259925
Subject
Political Science
SKU
9780691240039

Description

"Democratization after Democratization explores the conditions which led to the electoral reforms that swept Europe over the latter half of the nineteenth century. Many first-wave democracies-those that established voting rights in the early nineteenth century-held elections that were characterized by significant challenges and the widespread perception that electoral rights were hollow promises. Candidates bribed voters and took advantage of irregularities in the design of ballots to compromise the secrecy of the vote; police officers, tax collectors, and mayors mobilized voters with threats; and, when votes were finally counted, presidents of polling stations destroyed and replaced ballots. Yet beginning with the second half of the nineteenth century, most European countries introduced reforms intended to protect the integrity of the voting process. These reforms attempted to complete the democratic project and transform the nominal voting rights granted as a result of suffrage expansion into de facto political rights. To understand how this happened, Mares examines the different strategies aiming to reform electoral practices in Belgium, Britain, France, and Germany, which garnered varied results. She ultimately stresses the importance of legislator's motivations as the most important factor contributing to the support of electoral reforms. This largely had to do with rising costs associated with illicit strategies, which led to a mutual interest in an agreed upon set of electoral rules. Mares concludes that this historical pathway to reform highlights the importance of different strategies including introducing "piecemeal" electoral reforms that recognize the various political motivations of parties and legislators, minimizing unequal punishment for different kinds of illicit strategies, and raising the costs associated with political malfeasance, among others. By targeting motivations and incentives, rather than simply creating pressure from below, Mares argues that reformers today can find broader support and more effectively target corruption"--