Description
"A number of controversies swirl around the idea of constitutionalism. Some prominent critics of constitutionalism are concerned that its modern form, in which high courts play a large role, unduly limits popular self-governance. By committing their nations to detailed social and economic policies-from neoliberal requirements for balanced budgets to constitutionalized social welfare and environmental rights-many modern constitutions might be unduly rigid in light of changing social, economic, and environmental conditions. The rise of proto-authoritarian elected leaders around the world has generated concern about how to avoid democratic backsliding and reverse it when it has occurred. This book's argument is that addressing each of these serious concerns through constitutional design and innovation is potentially valuable, and paradoxically that each potentially valuable action has an underside that threatens to reproduce the conditions that give rise to the concerns in the first place. We suggest that scaling back our expectations about what we can get from constitutionalism will reduce our discontents. That scaling back takes the form of advocating for a mostly procedural and "thin" idea of constitutionalism"-- Provided by publisher.
