Description
"Following WW II the response by Britain, France, and Holland to rejuvenated colonial nationalist movements was patently indequate. Their ineffective counter was further exacerbated by Soviet expansion and the corresponding need to redeploy resources to protect the mother countries. At the same time, newly independent former colonies had no wish to become captives to the developing Cold War. Indeed, it may be argued that the Truman Doctrine was designed to serve notice on the USSR that the "Third World" was not up for grabs. Thus, the postwar decades found the US and the USSR in often violent conflict over the allegiance of less-developed nations around the globe. Results of this American intervention in the Third World are traditionally viewed by diplomatic historians as ranging from minor damage to disaster. In contrast, Brands insists this conventional wisdom is far from the mark. He agrees that US officials often spoke, possibly even thought, in ideological terms but those same policy-makers tended to act in a nonideological and remarkably successful fashion. Using American policy towards Yugoslavia, Egypt, and India as case studies, Brands presents a very convincing thesis in this remarkably engaging (if controversial) extended essay."--Choice Reviews.
