Description
"The second part of the book offers an alternative theory of interpretation in law which is based on the communication model. It is shown that the standard objections to this model have rested on serious misunderstandings. The theory of interpretation offered here is then brought to bear in defence of some of the more problematic and controversial tenets of legal positivism. Legal positivists are criticized for being committed to an untenable distinction between 'easy' and 'hard' cases. Having explained the ways in which this is the for legal positivism, the author offers a defence based on considerations drawn from the philosophy of language, particularly Wittgensteins's analysis of rule following. Finally, the author considers the age-old question of the role of legislative intent in statutory interpretation, and argues that a very limited form of deference to legislative intents can be derived from the very same considerations which justify one's compliance with an authority's directives in the first place." "The discussion throughout is guided by the thesis that interpretation is an exception to the standard understanding of language and communication, as it pertains only to those aspects of understanding which are underdetermined by rules or conventions. Interpretation and Legal Theory follows the tradition of analytical jurisprudence, and at the same time, combines philosophical arguments from the philosophy of language, aesthetics, and moral and political theory."--Jacket.
